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We view the notion of “trust” among entities (e.g., domains, principals, compo-
nents) engaged in various protocols as a set of relations established on the basis of
a body of supporting assurance (trust) evidence and required by specified policies
(e.g., by administrative procedures, business practice, law).
In traditional networks, most trust evidence is generated via potentially lengthy
assurance processes, distributed off-line, and assumed to be valid on long terms and
certain at the time when trust relations derived from it are exercised. Authentica-
tion and access-control trust relations established as a consequence of supporting
trust evidence are often cached as certificates and as trust links (e.g., hierarchi-
cal or peer links) among the principals included in these relations or among their
“home domains.” Both certificates and trust relations are later used in authorizing
client access to servers.
In contrast, few of these characteristics of trust relations and trust evidence are
prevalent in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). Lack of a fixed networking in-
frastructure, high mobility of the nodes, limited-range and unreliability of wireless
links are some of the characteristics of MANET environments that constrain the
design of a trust establishment scheme. In particular, trust relations may have to
be established using only on-line-available evidence, may be short-term and largely
peer-to-peer, where the peers may not necessarily have a relevant “home domain”
that can be placed into a recognizable trust hierarchy, and may be uncertain.
In this work we argue that for trust establishment in MANETs a substantial
body of trust evidence needs to be (1) generated, stored, and protected across
network nodes, (2) routed dynamically where most needed, and (3) evaluated “on
the fly” to substantiate dynamically formed trust relations. In particular, the
management of trust evidence should allow alternate paths of trust relations to
be formed and discovered using limited backtracking though the ad-hoc network,
and should balance between the reinforcement of evidence that leads to ”high-
certainty” trust paths and the ability to discover alternate paths.
Although we focus on authentication and access-control trust in this work,
similar notions can be defined for “correctness” trust relations required by system
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Figure 1.1: A soldier polls a sensor using its PDA through the mobile ad-hoc
network
design goals. System correctness is established by using layer decomposition and
abstraction such that correctness of a lower layer can be used as evidence for the
correctness-trust of a higher layer (i.e. Layer A “uses” layer B ⇔ ( Correctness of
A ⇒ Correctness of B )). In the rest of this introduction, we present the Mobile Ad-
Hoc Network environment and some exemples of (1) the generation of evidence for
correctness-trust establishment of a secure routing protocol, and (2) the generation
of on-line evidence for trust establishment in sensor networks.
1.1 Mobile Ad-Hoc networks
Ad-hoc networking refers to the spontaneous formation of a network of nodes with-
out the help of any infrastructure, usually through wireless communication chan-
nels. Figure 1.1 is an example of MANET: various type of units (infantry, artillery,
satellites, sensors) with different computation and communication capabilities. In
ad-hoc networks, a basic routing infrastructure emerges through the collaboration
of every node with its neighbors to forward packets towards chosen destinations.
This basic infrastructure is highly dynamic not just because of node mobility but
also because of lack of guaranteed node connectivity. In ad-hoc networks, lack
of guaranteed connectivity is caused by the limited-range, potentially unreliable,
wireless communication. The absence of a routing infrastructure that would as-
sure connectivity of both fixed and mobile nodes precludes using the traditional
internet protocols for routing, name resolution, trust establishment, etc.
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1.1.1 Secure routing in the MANETs
Early protocols that performed routing in MANETs [19][29][30] assumed that all
nodes were trusted; i.e., none of the nodes deliberately disrupted the routing proto-
col. More recently, several protocols were proposed to secure the routing layer from
nodes that act maliciously. These protocols integrate security features within tra-
ditional routing protocols, such as DSR, AODV, DSDV, and aim to protect against
message modification, fabrication or address spoofing through cryptographic means
[16][17][28]. However, all these protocols assume that secure associations between
the nodes of the network exist or can be established on-line. This assumption is
used as evidence to support the correctness-trust establishment of the routing layer
(e.g. proof of correctness of SRP by Papadimitratos and Haas [28]).
Typically, these associations consist of either symmetric keys shared between
any two nodes distributed with the help of a trusted key distribution center (KDC),
or public-key certificates associated with individual nodes and signed by a trusted
certification authority (CA). Security associations and trust relations among nodes
forms the basis for building the security features of the routing layer; e.g., message
authentication, replay detection.
The assumption of pre-established secure associations may be practical in en-
vironments where such associations can be established off-line [33]. However, this
assumption is less suitable for secure routing in large MANETs where secure as-
sociations have to be setup on-demand and on-line. Traditional Internet protocols
relying on centralised servers (KDC, CA) cannot be used here not only because
of the lack of guaranteed connectivity but also because there is cyclic dependency
airsing between security services (e.g., certificate distribution, shared key genera-
tion, distributed trust establishment) and routing services since security services
require routing layer security themselves. Because of this cyclic dependency the
correctness of the components establishing the secure association depends on the
correctness of the routing layer. It is therefore impossible to generate the evidence
necessary to establish a trusted routing layer.
In other work with Bobba, Gligor, and Arbaugh [6] we proposed a solution for
bootstrapping the security associations for secure routing without assuming any
trusted authorities or distributed trust-establishment services. We proposed to rely
on the use of statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable (SUCV) identi-
fiers [24], and public-secret key pairs generated by the nodes themselves, in much
the same way SUCVs are used in MobileIPv6 (MIPv6) to solve the address ”own-
ership” problem [24][27] and to counter the ”bidding down” attack [24] in return
routability. The correctness of SUCV does not depend on any other component
in the system and can be used as evidence to bootstrap the trust establishment of
the routing layer.
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1.1.2 Distributed sensor networks
Distributed Sensor Networks (DSNs) are a particular kind of MANETs charac-
terised by a large size (e.g., ten thousand as opposed to tens or hundreds of nodes)
and higly limited computation and communication capabilities. They present the
same challenges that any other MANET (abscence of infrastructure, mobility, lack
of guaranteed connectivity) but the computation constraint makes the design of
solutions even harder.
As for any other MANET, there is a need for secure communication between
nodes of a sensor networks and therefore a need to establish trust between nodes.
However the extreme power, computational, and communication limitations of
sensor nodes and the network scale preclude the of use the traditional crypto-
graphic tools to generate trust evidence and establish trust. For example, public
key cryptosystems and random-number generators cannot be used since they are
computationally intensive and consume a significant amount of power [8]. Use of
low-power, symmetric-key ciphers and modes of encryption becomes the only viable
means of protecting communication against monitoring by hostile adversaries.
Traditional Internet style key exchange and key distribution protocols based
on infrastructures using trusted third parties are also ruled out by sensor-node
processing limitations, unknown network topology, intermittent sensor-node oper-
ation, network scale and dynamics. To date, the only options for the distribution of
keys to sensor nodes of DSN whose physical topology is unknown prior to deploy-
ment would have to rely exclusively on key pre-distribution. Keys would have to be
installed in sensor nodes to accommodate full secure connectivity between nodes.
However, traditional key pre-distribution offers two inadequate solutions: either
a single mission key or a set of separate n-1 keys, each being pair-wise privately
shared between every two nodes, must be installed in every sensor node.
In other work with V.D. Gligor [12] we propose a key pre-distribution scheme
that requires memory storage for only few tens of keys, and yet has similar security
and superior operational properties to those of the pair-wise private, key-sharing
scheme. It relies on probabilistic key-sharing among the nodes of a random graph
and uses a simple secure shared-key discovery protocol for key distribution, revo-
cation and node re-keying. We distribute a ring of keys to each sensor node, each
key ring consisting of randomly chosen k keys from a very large pool of P keys,
which is generated off-line, prior to DSN deployment. This secure distribution of
key-rings form the basis of the evidence used in the trust establishment during op-
erations. Because of the random choice of keys on key rings, a shared key may not
exist between some pairs of nodes precluding them to establish trust. Although
two nodes may or may not share a key, if a trust path of nodes sharing pair-wise
private keys exists between the two nodes at network initialization, the two nodes
can use that trusted path to exchange a key that will establish a direct trust link.
In this case the nodes use already established trust relations with other nodes as
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evidence to establish a new trust relation.
We use random graph analysis and simulation to show that what really mat-
ters in key pre-distribution is the shared-key connectivity of the resulting secure
network. Therefore, the full shared-key connectivity offered by pair-wise, private
key sharing between every two nodes becomes unnecessary. For example, we show
that to establish shared-key connectivity in a 10,000-node network, a key ring of
only 250 keys have to be pre-distributed to every sensor node where the keys were
drawn out of a pool of 100,000 keys. We also show that the security characteris-
tics of probabilistic key distribution and revocation based on random graphs are
suitable for solving the key management problem of DSNs.
1.2 Organization
This work is organized in five chapters. The first chapter is this introduction, defin-
ing the new environment of the MANET and presenting a set of specific problems
related to authentication, access control, and correctness trust establishment in
the MANET. The rest of this thesis focuses on the problem of authentication-trust
establishment and evidence distribution.
The second chapter introduces trust establishment. Basic notions are ex-
plained, prior and related work is presented, and trust establishment in the MANET
is discussed and compared to the traditional networks. In the third chapter our ap-
proach to (trust) evidence distribution is explained. We present different schemes
based on peer-to-peer file-sharing and swarm intelligence. The fourth chapter
covers the evaluation of our scheme through an implementation in NS-2 and sim-




In this chapter, we review some of the basic notions of trust establishment and
explore how these notions differ in the MANET environment from those in the
Internet environmnet. We also derive a set of requirements for trust establishment
in MANETs. Much of the theory underlying the presentation of basic notions can
be found in Maurer [23], Kohlas and Maurer [20], Lampson and Abadi [22], and
Gligor[13]. We focus exclusively on some empirical properties of evidence for trust
establishment that help differentiate the traditional Internet notions from those of
MANETs.
2.1 Basic Notions of Trust Establishment
We view the process of trust establishment as the application of an evaluation
metric to a body of trust evidence. The outcome of the trust establishment pro-
cess is a trust relation. The evidence may be obtained on- or off-line and may
include already established trust relations. An established trust relation consti-
tutes evidence that can be used in other trust establishment processes, and can
be composed with other relations to form more abstract or more general trust
relations. The composition of trust relations usually requires the composition of
evidence and of evidence evaluations.
2.1.1 An Example of Authentication-Trust Establishment
Consider the trust relation “A accepts B’s authentication of X”, which is estab-
lished between principals A, B, and X. This relation is established as the compo-
sition of two basic relations resulting from two separate trust-establishment pro-
cesses; i.e., “certification authority B accepts X’s authentication evidence,” and
“certification authority A accepts B’s authentication of any principal registered by
B”. The first relation may be established by principal B’s off-line evaluation of
a body of trust evidence presented by principal X. For example, B may require
several pieces of evidence attesting to X’s identity. Specifically, B may require two
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pieces of authentication evidence from the following set: driver license, passport,
employment identity card, documentation indicating current property ownership
or credit-line activity. Once the trust relation is established, it is cached as (1) a
certificate signed by B associating X’s public key with X, and (2) a relation stored
in B’s “trust database” registering principal X with B. The domain of certification
authority B becomes X’s “home domain.”
The second relation, namely “certification authority A accepts B’s authentica-
tion of any principal registered by B,” may be established by principal A’s off-line
evaluation of a body of trust evidence presented by principal B indicating that:
- certification authority B’s authentication of the principals registered with it
(e.g., X) is done using “acceptable” mechanisms and policies; and
- certification authority B’s registration database, which includes principal X’s
registration, is protected using “acceptable” mechanisms and policies;
- certification authority B’s server is managed using ”acceptable” administra-
tive, physical, and personnel policies;
- certification authority B does not have skills and interests that diverge from
those of A.
Evidence regarding the “acceptability” of various mechanisms and policies is
collected off-line, using potentially lengthy assurance procedures, such as those pre-
scribed by the Common Criteria’s assurance evaluation levels [10]. Certification
authority A uses an evaluation metric to determine whether B’s authentication
mechanisms and policies are (at least) as good as his own, and the evidence used
by the metric is stable and long-term. Evidence is stable if the authentication
mechanisms and policies used by B do not change, either intentionally or acciden-
tally, unbeknownst to A. Evidence is long-term, if it lasts at least as long as the
process of gathering and evaluating assurance evidence, which can be of the order
of weeks or months. After the trust relation “certification authority A accepts B’s
authentication of any principal registered by B” is established by A, it is cached
(1) as a certificate associating B’s public key with B that is signed by A, and (2)
as a relation stored in A’s “trust database” registering principal B with A. The
domain of certification authority A becomes B’s “home domain.”
Although we focus on authentication in this example, similar notions can be
defined for trust establishment in the access control arera.
2.1.2 Transitivity of Trust Establishment
Trust relation “certification authority A accepts B’s authentication of any princi-
pal registered by B” is clearly reflexive since A accepts its own authentication of
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principals it registers. However, should it be transitive? That is, should the trust
establishment process be transitive? For example, if “A accepts B’s authentication
of any principal registered by B” and “B accepts Y’s authentication of principal Z
registered by Y,” does it mean that “A accepts Y’s authentication of principal Z
registered by Y”? And if so, does this hold for any principals Y and Z?
Before accepting that transitivity should hold, A uses his “evaluation metric”
to determine two properties of evidence. First, A determines that B’s evaluation of
Y’s body of evidence is the same as (or stronger than) A’s evaluation of B’s body
of evidence (viz., example 2.1.1). Second, A determines that B’s trust relation
with Y is (at least) as stable and long-term as his A’s own with B. If these two
properties of evidence hold for all Y’s and Z’s, then the more general trust relation
“A accepts Y’s authentication of any principal” should also hold. In practice, this
general trust relation would hold for all Y’s whose home domains are sub-domains
of B’s home domain. This is the case because B would control the adequacy,
stability, and duration of Y’s authentication mechanisms and policies, and hence
could provide the evidence that would satisfy A’s evaluation metric. However,
evidence regarding Y’s authentication mechanisms and policies may not pass A’s
evaluation metric, and A would not accept Y’s authentication of any principal.
For example, the evidence used in establishing B’s trust relation with Y may be
short-lived or unstable. In this case, Y could change its authentication policies,
thereby invalidating evaluated evidence, unbeknownst to A and B. A would want
to be protected from such events by denying transitivity regardless of whether B
accepts Y’s authentication of Z.
The principal characteristics of evidence used to establish transitive trust in the
example given above are “uniformity” and “availability.” Uniformity means that all
evidence used to establish transitive trust satisfied the same, global, “metrics” of
adequacy, stability, and long-term endurance. Availability means that all evidence
could be evaluated either on-line or off-line at any time by a principal wishing to
establish a trust relation.
2.1.3 Uncertainty in Trust Establishment
Transitive trust formed the basis for the definition of simple trust hierarchies, pos-
sibly interconnected by “peer” links. All early system designs supporting such
hierarchies assumed either implicitly [22] or explicitly [13] that evidence for rec-
ommending trust from principal to principal was “uniform” and ”available.” In
contrast, starting with Yahalom et al. [38], it was realized that, in general, trust
evidence need not be uniform and hence could be uncertain. Pretty Good Pri-
vacy (PGP) [39] provides the first practical example where some “uncertainty” is
allowed in authentication, although PGP does not support transitive trust. Later
work by Kohlas and Maurer [20] formalizes the notion of evidence uncertainty and
provides precise and fairly general principles for evaluating trust evidence.
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2.1.4 Guaranteed Connectivity to Trust-Infrastructure
Servers
To be scalable, Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) establish trust among certifica-
tion authorities rather than among individual principals. Transitive trust relations
among certification authorities allows us to establish authentication trust among
principals registered by different certification authorities, since it allows the traver-
sal of certification authorities separating pairs of principals; i.e., the traversal of
trust paths. Traversal of trust paths does not require that certification authorities
be on-line permanently. Certification authorities store certificates in directories as-
sociated with “home domains” whenever trust relations are established, and hence
directory hierarchies mirror trust hierarchies. Therefore, directory servers must be
available and on-line permanently to enable trust path traversals by any principal
at any time, whereas certification authority servers need be on-line only when trust
relations are established and certificates are signed and stored in directories. Nev-
ertheless, principals establishing trust relations or traversing directory hierarchies
to establish, or verify the validity of, trust paths need guaranteed communication
connectivity to certification authority and directory servers.
2.2 Why is the Mobile Ad-Hoc Network differ-
ent?
The absence of a routing infrastructure that would assure connectivity of both
fixed and mobile nodes precludes supporting a stable, long-term, trust infrastruc-
ture, such as a hierarchy of trust relations among subsets of network nodes. It
also constrains the trust establishment process to short, fast, on-line-only proto-
cols using only subsets of the established trust relations, since not all nodes that
established trust relations may be reachable.
2.2.1 Trust Establishment without a Trust Infrastructure
In general, the Internet relies on a fixed trust infrastructure of certification-authority
and directory servers for both fixed and mobile nodes (i.e., Mobile IPv6 nodes).
These servers must be available on-line and reachable by principals when needed;
e.g., certification authority servers, when certificates are created and signed, and
directory servers permanently.
In contrast, a fixed infrastructure of certification-authority and directory servers
may not always be reachable in a MANET (viz. Section 2.3, scenarios 2 and 3).
This is because MANETs cannot assure the connectivity required to these servers;
e.g., both a mobile node and the foreign-domain nodes with which it communicates
can be disconnected from the directory server storing the certificates defined in that
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node’s home domain. Note that this is not the case for mobility in the Internet:
Mobile IPv6 takes care of roaming by providing a “care of” address bound to the
actual mobile address. This solution is not possible for MANETs since the home
of a node and its “care of” address may be physically unreachable. Therefore,
MANETs cannot rely exclusively on trust relations that are represented as cer-
tificates stored in directory hierarchies, since connectivity to the required servers
may not be available when needed. MANETs must support peer-to-peer relations
defined as the outcomes of any principal’s evaluation of trust evidence from any
principals in the network, and must store these trust relations in the nodes of the
ad-hoc network.
2.2.2 Short-lived, Fast, and On-line-only Trust Establish-
ment
In the Internet, trust relations are established for the long term and are stable.
This is possible if security policies and assurances do not change very often and
therefore do not need to be re-evaluated frequently.
In contrast, there is little long-term stability of evidence in MANETs. The
security of a mobile node may depend of its location and cannot be a priori deter-
mined. For example, node capture by an adversary becomes possible and probable
in some environments such as military battlefields. Trust relations involving a cap-
tured node need to be invalidated, and new trust evidence need to be collected and
evaluated to maintain node connectivity in the ad-hoc network. Therefore, trust
relations can be short-lived and the collection and evaluation of trust evidence
becomes a recurrent and relatively frequent process. This process has to be fast to
avoid crippling delays in the communication system; e.g., two mobile nodes may
have a short time frame to communicate because of wireless range limitations, and
trust establishment should not prevent these nodes from communicating securely
by imposing a slow, lengthy process. To be fast, the trust establishment process
may have to be executed entirely on-line since off-line collection and evaluation of
evidence is impractical; e.g., visually verifying an identity document is not possible.
2.2.3 Trust Establishment with Incomplete Evidence
In the Internet, it is highly improbable that some trust relation remains unavail-
able for extended periods of time (e.g., a certificate verification on a trust path
cannot performed for a day) due to connectivity failures. Network connectivity is
guaranteed through redundancy of communication links, and routes and servers
are replicated to guarantee availability. In general, it is fair to assume that the
entire body of evidence necessary for trust establishment is available in the Inter-
net when needed. In contrast, node connectivity is not guaranteed in MANETs
and all established evidence cannot be assumed to be available for all nodes all
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the time. Trust establishment has to be performed with incomplete and hence
uncertain trust evidence.
2.2.4 Summary of the requirements
In summary, trust establishment in MANETs requires protocols that are:
- peer-to-peer, independent of a pre-established trust infrastructure (i.e., cer-
tification authority and directory servers);
- short, fast, and on-line; and
- flexible and support uncertain and incomplete trust evidence.
2.3 An Example with Three Scenarios
We present an example to intuitively show the differences between the internet
and the MANET environment in respect to trust establishment. The three related
scenarios take place in a battelfield environment, but we could have come with
similar examples in the civil world.
2.3.1 Scenario 1
Figure 2.1: A battlefield scenario. UK1 is lost and can only communicate with
US1
In Figure 2.1 we illustrate a battlefield environment in which units of coalition of
United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) forces perform separate operations.
To support these operations, various communication systems are involved, ranging
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from short-range wireless (e.g., for infantry), to long-range directional wireless
links (e.g., used between artillery pieces), and to satellite communication (e.g.,
connecting the battlefield with the US and UK operation commands).
In this scenario, assume that a British unit (UK1) is lost and takes refuge in
a nearby cave. UK1 needs to call for backup, but the only unit in communication
range is an American unit (US1) taking part in a different operation than that of
UK1. The British unit, UK1, has to authenticate itself to US1 to get access to the
ad-hoc US network and call the UK operations command for help. UK1 requests
access to the ad-hoc US network and presents an identity certificate signed by
UKCA, the British certification authority. The US network access policy requires
that any accessor presents a valid identity certificate from a US-recognized and
trusted authority. Node US1 needs to decide whether the node claiming to be
UK1 should be allowed access to the ad-hoc US network. To decide wether UK1’s
certificate is valid, US1 contacts the directory server at US operations command
and obtains a UKCA certificate signed by USCA, the US certification author-
ity. US1 verifies and accepts USCA’s signature on the UKCA’s certificate, then
accepts UKCA’s signature on UK1’s certificate, thereby exercising the transitive
trust relations established between the US and UK operations commands and their
respective units. Node US1 grants access to the ad-hoc US network to UK1. Note
that the established trust infrastructure of the Internet helps solve UK1’s problem,
since all necessary trust relations (i.e., evaluated evidence) are available on-line.
2.3.2 Scenario 2
Assume that, due to inclement weather conditions, satellite links are unavailable.
When US1 receives UK1’s request and certificate signed by UKCA, it can’t contact
its operations command center to retrieve UKCA’s certificate from a directory
server, and therefore it cannot verify the signature on UK1’s certificate. However,
suppose that a couple hours ago while in a different operation, a US helicopter
unit, US3, visually identified the lost British unit, UK1. US3 could have proactively
generated a certificate for UK1 and made it available in the ad-hoc US network.
Alternately, US3 could generate and sign a certificate for UK1 now. This piece
of evidence is the only one that can be helpful in this scenario; however there is
currently no scheme to specify how and when it should be generated, how it can
be distributed to others in the network, how it is evaluated by US1 to make its
final decision and finally how it can be revoked by US3 if needed. In chapter 3 we
present our approach on how to solve these issues.
2.3.3 Scenario 3
Figure 2.3 illustrates a United Nations humanitarian convoy (UN1) that is ap-
proaching and preparing to cross a bridge separating two battlefield “zones”. Be-
12
Figure 2.2: A battlefield scenario. UK1 is lost and can only communicate with
US1. The satellite links are down due to inclement weather
Figure 2.3: A battlefield scenario
fore crossing the bridge to enter the new zone, UN1 must request a “zone report”
from nearby military units to verify that the zone is safe. UN1 sends a request for a
zone report and attaches its credentials (Table 2.1.b) as authentication evidence to
the request. A British unit, UK3, receives the request and is in a position to issue a
zone report. However, to issue the zone report, UK3 needs to apply its evaluation
metric (Table 2.1.d and 2.1.e) to the presented evidence (and the evidence already
in its possession by other means) and to verify that it satisfies the policy it must
enforce for providing zone reports (Table 2.1.a). However, UK3 has a limited set
of already established trust relations (Table 2.1.c) and it is not hard to see that
some evidence provided by UN1 (1) is useful but cannot be verified (i.e., certifi-
cates signed by USCA and US3 cannot be verified by UK3 since it does not have
a direct trust relation to USCA and US3 and the satellite links are unavailable);
or (2) can be verified but is not useful (i.e., GPS1 is trusted to provide location
information but the UK3 evaluation metric rates any GPS source to provide only
low-confidence information whereas high-confidence information is required by the
UK3 policy). Therefore, UK3 needs to collect and evaluate evidence regarding
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USCA and US3 using the ad-hoc network only, since the central directory at its
operation command remains unavailable.
a. UK3’s policy for providing “zone reports”:
(Role = UK/US military ∨ UN convoy) with confidence = medium
∧(Location=neighbors) with confidence = high




c. UK3’s trust relations:
UKCA for Role; GPS1, UAV1, and UK1 for Location
d. UK3’s metric for confidence evaluation of location evidence
Type(source) = GPS and source trusted → confidence = low
Type(source) = UAV and source trusted → confidence = low
Type(src1) = UAV ∧ Type(src2) = GPS
and src1 and src2 trusted → confidence = medium
Type(source) = Visual and source trusted → confidence = high
Other → confidence = null
e. UK3’s metric for confidence evaluation of role evidence:
Type(source) = CA and source trusted → confidence = high
Other → confidence = null
Table 2.1: An Example of a Policy Statement, Evaluation Metric, and Credentials
and Trust Relations
2.4 Related Work
2.4.1 Pretty Good Privacy
In PGP [39], any user can sign another user’s key. These signatures form a network
of peer trust relations, often described as the web of trust [39]. The confidence in a
trust path between two nodes of the web of trust is evaluated via a simple metric
consisting of 4 “levels of trust” and a set of rules (e.g.: a key is marginally trusted
if signed by two independent, marginally trusted, keys).
Although the PGP web of trust is fully peer-to-peer in its concepts, it is not
in implementation. Public keys are published in key servers [32] maintaining a
database of keys and discovering trust paths amongst them. This solution is effi-
cient for the Internet but not possible for the MANET since there is no guaranteed
connectivity with a key server. Hubaux et al. [18] propose a distributed imple-
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mentation of PGP where each user stores a subset of the trust graph and proceeds
to fusion of his set with other users’ sets to discover trust path.
The trust metric implemented in PGP is simple and can lead to counter intu-
itive decision being made, as discussed by Mauer[20].
2.4.2 IBM’s Trust Establishment system
IBM Research Laboratory developed a trust establishment framework [15] allowing
the “bottom-up” emergence of a public-key infrastructure through exchange of cer-
tificates, containing various pieces of evidence about principals, and evaluation of
these by a Trust Policy Language. When certificates about a principal are missing,
they are automatically collected from peer servers. The policy language supports
negative certificates, which allows complex non-monotonous policies. However,
the trust policy language does not support uncertain evidence explicitly; as this is
considered part of the policy specification.
This work is targeted to the Internet, where connectivity is guaranteed between
servers. Missing certificates are collected from peer servers (either known a priori
or referenced in other certificates). The collection mechanism is not suitable for
the MANET environment were connectivity is not guaranteed. Our peer-to-peer
evidence distribution mechanism would be a suitable solution to replace the certifi-
cate repositories and support the IBM’s trust engine to provide a full peer-to-peer
implementation.
2.4.3 The resurrecting duckling
Stajano and Anderson’s resurrecting duckling [33] and its descendants [34] [2] rep-
resent a peer-to-peer trust establishment framework in which principals authen-
ticate their communication channel by first exchanging keying material via an
out-of-band physical contact. The goal of this approach is different from ours; i.e.,
it is not intended to provide peer-to-peer entity authentication, nor is it intended
to handle uncertain evidence. The established trust is binary: the communication
channel is either secure or is not.
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Chapter 3
A Framework for Trust Establishment in the
MANET
In this chapter, we present our framework for trust establishment in the MANET.
We first give an overview of the scheme and its three components: generation,
distribution, and evaluation of trust evidence. We then detail our evidence dis-
tribution scheme, based on peer-to-peer file-sharing systems. We also propose a
swarm based scheme for evidence distribution that has the same properties as a
p2p system without some of its drawbacks.
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 Generation of trust evidence
In our approach, any node can generate trust evidence about any other node.
Evidence may be an identity, a public key, a location, an independent security
assessment, or any other information required by the policy and the evaluation
metric used to establish trust. Evidence is usually obtained off-line (e.g. visual
identification, audio exchange [2], physical contact [33][34], etc.), but can also be
obtained on-line. When a principal generates a piece of evidence, he signs it with
its own private key, specify its lifetime and makes it available to other through the
network. PGP is an instance of this framework, where evidence is only a public
key.
A principal may revoke a piece of evidence it produced by generating a revoca-
tion certificate for that piece of evidence and making it available to others, at any
time before the evidence expires. Moreover, a principal can revoke evidence gen-
erated by others by creating contradictory evidence and distributing it. Evidence
that invalidates other extant evidence can be accumulated from multiple, indepen-
dent, and diverses sources and will cause trust metrics to produce low confidence
parameters.
It may seem dangerous to allow anyone to publish evidence within the ad-hoc
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network without control of any kind. For example, a malicious node may introduce
and sign false evidence thereby casting doubt about the current trust relations of
nodes and forcing them to try to verify the veracity of the (false) evidence. To
protect against malicious nodes, whenever the possibility of invalidation of extant
trust evidence (e.g., evidence revocation) arises, the policy must require redundant,
independent pieces of (revocation) evidence from diverse sources before starting the
evaluation process. Alternatively, the evaluation metric of the policy may rate the
evidence provided by certain nodes as being low-confidence information. In any
case, the policy and its evaluation metric can also be designed to protect against
false evidence.
3.1.2 Distribution of trust evidence
Every principal is required to sign the pieces of evidence it produces. A principal
can distribute trust evidence within the network and can even get disconnected
afterwards. A producer of trust evidence does not have to be reachable at the time
its evidence is being evaluated. Evidence can be replicated across various nodes
to guarantee availability. This problem of evidence availability is similar to those
that appear in distributed data storage systems, where information is distributed
across multiple nodes in a network, and a request for a piece of stored information
is dynamically routed to the closest source.
However, trust evidence distribution is more complex than a simple ”request
routing” problem. A principal may need more than one answer per request, and
hence all valid answers to a request should ideally be collected. For example,
REQUEST(Alice/location) should return all pieces of evidence about the location
of Alice. Typical distributed data storage systems do not return all valid requests;
e.g. REQUEST(my song.mp3) would return one file even if there are multiple ver-
sions of my song each having different bit rates and length. Moreover a principal
may simply not know what evidence to request, and hence wildcard requests have
to be supported; e.g. REQUEST(Alice/*) should return all pieces of evidence about
Alice available in the network.
3.1.3 Application of an evaluation metric to a body of ev-
idence
In specifying a trust management policy, we distinguish between a policy decision
and a trust metric for practical rather than fundamental reasons. A metric is used
to assign a confidence value to pieces of evidence of the same nature. For instance,
if we have three sources of evidence providing three different locations for Alice,
how do we determine Alice’s actual location and how confident are we of that
determination? Different metrics may be used for different type of evidence (e.g.
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one may use a discrete level metric to characterize confidence in location, but a
continuous metric to characterize confidence in a public key).
In contrast, a policy decision is a local procedure which, based on a set of
evidence parameters and their required confidence value, outputs the outcome of
the decision. In practice, policy decisions are locally enforced but may be based
on trust metrics shared by other local policies. Similarly, the same policy decision
may use different trust metrics (as in the case of UK3’s metrics in Scenario 3 above)
for different parameters. Different types of policy decisions have been proposed
that apply a policy to a set of credentials and output a decision [4], [5].
Trust metrics to evaluate uncertain and incomplete sets of evidence has been
an active field of research. Different “trust metrics” have been developed [38],
[31], [23] and properties of these metrics have been studied [20]. However, the
only practical trust metric developed and implemented has been the one of PGP
[39]. Based on a very limited notion of uncertainty, this metric handles only the
evaluation of trust in a chain of keys, with limited “levels of trust” (i.e. untrusted,
marginal, full). There is a need to develop new trust metrics that apply to different
types of evidence, not just chains of keys, are fine-grained in the sense that output
wide set of uncertainty levels, and are flexible, in the sense that they can apply to
incomplete sets of evidence.
3.2 Peer-to-peer file sharing for evidence distri-
bution.
The problem of evidence distribution shares many characteristics of distributed
data storage systems, and yet is different. It is interesting to examine current peer-
to-peer, file-sharing systems to understand their characteristics and limitations
regarding trust evidence distribution. Peer-to-peer networking has received a lot
of attention recently, particularly from the services industry [25],[14], the open-
source [9] and research communities [1], [35]. They evolved from very simple
protocols, such as Napster (which uses a centralized index) and Gnutella (which
uses request flooding) to more elaborate ones, such as Freenet (which guarantees
request anonymity and uses hash-based request routing) [9] and Oceanstore (which
routes requests using Plaxton trees)[21].
3.2.1 Overview of Freenet
Freenet [9] is a distributed storage system that supports the distribution of infor-
mation while protecting the anonymity of both the generator and the requestor of
a piece of information. It is a strictly peer-to-peer network, no centralised index is
used, in place an efficient request routing protocol is used to find information in the
network. All nodes contribute to Freenet by providing storage space, helping to
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Figure 3.1: An example of a request routing in Freenet
route request in the network; however it is not possible for a node (or an outsider)
to know what is stored in its local cache; therefore a node can’t be held liable for
its content and it is not possible to know which node to bring down to remove a
document from the Freenet.
The request routing in freenet is based on hashed keyword. To search for a
document, a node hashes the requested document’s name and use the hash as the
search key. A request is routed towards the destination that is the more likely
to have a document corresponding to that key in cache. To determine the next
hop for a request, a node maintain a table mapping hash of succesfull requests
with nodes; when a new request arrives, the node search the routing table for the
entry which hash is the closest to the request hash and forward the message to the
corresponding node. If the request is successful, it is answered using the reverse
path and every node update its routing table by adding the request hash and the
corresponding node in its table. Figure 3.1 shows an example of request routing
in freenet. Note than when B receives the data reply for hash1 it can either add
an entry for the corresponding hash with D or F as the next hop, depending on
implementation.
To complement the routing, a caching mechanism is implemented in freenet to
increase availability of highly requested documents through the network. When
a request is answered, the node on the reply path have the possibility to cache
the document locally. This has the effect to bring documents towards the places
where they are the most requested and therefore optimize futher requests. Different
caching policies have been proposed for freenet, trying to determine which node
should cache what and when. A new approach based on a small world analysis of
freenet has been proposed by Zhang et al.[40].
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3.2.2 Freenet for evidence distribution
We analyzed Freenet as a tool for evidence distribution because of the charac-
teristics of its request routing architecture. In particular, in Freenet requests are
routed in the network instead of flooding. Files are replicated by caching at every
node and frequently requested files are highly replicated across the network while
file that are rarely requested are slowly evicted from caches. Request routing in
Freenet is adaptive and improves with time; combined with the caching policy it
shows an interesting locality property: information converges where needed and is
forgotten where not requested. This suits particularly well the locality property of
trust establishment in the MANET (a node tends to establish trust with nearby
neighbors). This optimized routing allows faster distribution and revocation of
pieces of evidence.
However, the Freenet approach does not support wildcard requests and pro-
vides only one answer per request (due to the nature of its routing mechanism).
Moreover, access to various sources of information evolves only by path reinforce-
ment. As a consequence, some sources of information providing non-usable data
are reinforced, and other sources are not discovered. The reinforcement strategy
of Freenet does not preserve the diversity of information sources in the network.
A new system has to be designed that shares the advantages of Freenet without
exhibiting its drawbacks.
3.3 Swarm intelligence for trust evidence distri-
bution.
3.3.1 Basic notions
Swarm intelligence [7] is a framework developed from the observation of ants’
colonies. While a single ant is a very simple insect, groups of ants can cooperate
and solve complex problems such as finding the shortest path to a food source or
building complex structures. Ants do not communicate directly with each other;
instead they induce cooperation by interacting with their environment (e.g., leaving
a pheromone trail). When trying to find an optimum solution (e.g., shortest path
to food source), cooperation leads to reinforcement of good solutions (positive
feedback); more over, the natural decay of a pheromone trail enables regulation
(negative feedback) that helps the discovery of new paths.
Numerous algorithms have been developed from these observations and applied
to problems such as the traveling salesman, graph coloring, routing in networks
[36][11]. Swarm intelligence is particularly suited for solving optimization problems
in dynamically changing environments such as those of MANETs because of the
balance between positive feedback that helps reinforce a good solution and the
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regulation process that enables discovery of new solutions appearing because of
changes in the environment.
The problem of discovering proper sources of trust evidence in a MANET (and
the problem of resource discovery in a network in general) is similar to the discovery
of food supplies for an ant colony. It requires exploration of the environment with
reinforcement of good solutions but also regulation that allows new sources to be
discovered.
3.3.2 A swarm-intelligence based scheme for evidence dis-
covery
We now describe the conceptual ideas behind our ant-based scheme. The goal of
this design is to achieve the same performances as the Freenet routing/caching
while preserving diversity of evidence by discovering all sources in the network.
This design is built following the experience of Subramanian et al. [36], and Di
Cargo and Dorigo [11] in their various routing protocol for dynamic networks.
We build our ant protocol directly above the link layer. Ant packets and
requests are routed by the ant algorithm and don’t depend on another routing
protocol. We believe that if an ant-based routing protocol is used also for route
discovery, it could be easily integrated with this protocol for resource (evidence)
discovery.
Routing is still based on the hash of the request, so that the space of possible
requests is known in advance. It also allows us to have similar anonimity properties
to those of the Freenet system.
Ants exploring the network: Periodically, each host sends a “fake” request for
a chosen hashed keyword. This hash may be randomly chosen in the hash space
(simplest design) or chosen based on the previous requests by that host. If a host
generates a lot of requests for evidence about Alice but none about Bob (two
different hashed keywords) then the host will generate more ants towards the first
hash than the second. The request is of the form (hashr, source,TTL), where hashr
is the requested hash, source the initiator of the request, and TTL is an upper limit
on the number of hops that the request can traverse. This small message is the
ant of our protocol.
The ant is routed in the network towards a host in possession of a document
with a corresponding hash. At each hop the packet is routed via a probabilistic
routing and the TTL is decremented. When the ant finds a document with corre-
sponding hash a backward ant is generated and routed back to the source. If the
TTL goes to zero before a document is found, the ant is destroyed. The backward
ant is the one responsible for updating the routing tables.
Probabilistic ant routing: Unlike Freenet, which routes requests always to the
host with the closest hash, our ant routing is probabilistic. Each host h maintains
a routing table with entries of the form (hashk, (y1, p1), ..., (yn, pn)) where ∀i, yi
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Figure 3.2: The topology used for example 3.3.3 Node A is in wireless range of B,
C, D, E. The document stored and their respective hash is also showed
is a one-hop wireless neighbor of h. When h receives a request for hashk it will
forward the request to y1 with probability p1.
Update of routing tables by backward ants: A backward ant is generated when
an ant finds a document matching the requested hash. The backward ant is the
message (hashr, source). This ant is routed back to the source on the reverse path
and updates all routing tables on its way back.
When a host receives a backward ant from neighbor yi, it updates all entries in
its routing table. For all hash entries in the table, the probabilities (hk, (y1, p1),







, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, i 	= j
where ∆p = k
f(d)
, k > 0, d the distance between hashk and hashr, and f(d) is a
non-decreasing function of d.
In the next section we present a simple example and show how this scheme con-
verges in similar routing decisions than freenet while preserving knowledge about
all sources of evidence.
3.3.3 An example
We describe a very simple example showing intuitively how the ant search works
and why it produces results similar to Freenet, while preserving all sources of
evidence. For this example, we choose k=0.1 and f(d) = e
1
2
d and we assume a
hash space of one hundred entries (while it should be on the order of 232 in real
operations as in Freenet).
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hash B C D E
0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
...
4 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.21
5 0.4 0.20 0.20 0.20
6 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.21
...
99 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Table 3.1: The probabilistic routing table of node A after receiving an ant from B
in scenario 1.
Figure 3.2 shows the neighborhood in wireless range of node A. To forward
a request, A must decide which of its neighbor is the most likely to answer it or
properly forward it to find an answer. We assume that each node stores at least
one document and show the corresponding hash on the figure.
Scenario 1. Node A initialise its routing table by assigning an equal probability
for every output node, for every hash. A then starts the process of generating ants
and eventually generates an ant for hash #5, this ant has one chance over four
to be forwarded towards B. If this is the case, there is a match at B, and the
backward ant updates A’s routing table as shown on table 3.1. After enough ants
are generated, all knowledge is found (hash #19 at C, hash #48 at D, and hash #93
at E) and the probabilistic routing table is shown in figure 3.3. Note than there
is no need of special bootstrapping of the system as this is the case for Freenet,
but that such a bootstrapping (all neighbors broadcasting the hash of their first
document) may accelerate this process.
To send a request (or insert a document), A selects the next hop with the high-
est probability for the hash of the request. This part of the routing is deterministic,
only the routing of ants and wildcard requets are probalistic. It can be seen on
figure 3.3 that the routing decision for A will be exactly the same if Freenet was
used instead of our swarm algorithm. Up to now the “clustering” of the hash space
is identical with Freenet or with our swarm algorithm (e.g. node B will receive
requests/inserts from A for hash #0 to #12).
Scenario 2. We now show how our algorithm “rewards” nodes storing more
documents than other nodes in the network. We assume that node C also has
documents corresponding to hash #25 in its repository and it is found by an ant
from A (after generating an ant for hash #25 and routing to C, with probability
.31), A updates its routing table as shown on figure 3.4. In Freenet, this new entry
would not affect at all the cluster of B (i.e. node B would still receive requests for
hash #0 to #12 from A), but it can be easily seen on the routing table that the
cluster for B is now only covering #0 to #9.
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Figure 3.3: The probabilistic routing table of A, after scenario 1
Figure 3.4: The probabilistic routing table of A, after scenario 2
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Scenario 3. When node A needs to send a wildcard request or need more than
one answer for a request it selectively floods the network based on the probabilistic
table. For example, we assume that A needs all possible documents of hash #17
but no more than 50 (not to overload the network). It generates 50 requests and
forward them using the probabilistic routing table. On the average A will send 13
requests to B, 18 o C, 10 to D and 9 to E (these requests can be grouped in a same
packet with format (hashr, source, nbr requests, TTL)). The next hop proceeds the




In this chapter, we present the result of our simulations of freenet in a MANET
to distribute trust evidence. We were interested in understanding the effect of
mobility and routing on the performaces of freenet; we also wanted to measure the
impact of the request routing on the diversity of evidence stored in the network.
4.1 Simulations framework
We implemented freenet in NS-2 [26] above the CMU Mobility extensions. The
agent is implemented as an application above the network layer such that the
freenet packets (from one freenet node to another) are routed using standard pro-
tocol such as DSR, AODV, DSDV. However it is possible to disable the routing
layer and to use the agent directly above the link layer; in this case the next hop
of a request has to be a neighbor.
The mobility model is the random waypoint model. Nodes are characterised
by a speed, randomly chosen between 0 and max speed, and a pause time p during
which a node stop moving before changing, randomly, of direction. Decreasing
the pause time corresponds to increasing the mobility in the network, therefore to
study the effects of mobility we run an experiment for various values of the pause
time.
An experiment consists of multiple rounds. Each round has two phases: during
the first phase 300 random documents are inserted and retrieved from the network
from randomly chosen nodes; during the second phase exactly 100 requests, for
documents known to have been inserted in the network, are performed and mea-
surement is collected. As the round proceeds the routing is naturally improving
and documents are being replicated through the network.
The network consist of 50 nodes (wireless range of 250 meters) randomly dis-
persed in a 1km x 1km zone. It means that the network is highly connected and
that the average number of hops between two nodes is of 2.
Figure 4.1 shows a typicall experiment visualised under NAM. The nodes bouded
by a square box shows where a specific document is stored (replicated via caching)
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Figure 4.1: Visualizing an experiment with NAM
while the nodes bouded in a circle shows the visited nodes during a search.
4.2 Evaluation
4.2.1 Comparing Freenet to Gossiping
To understand the advantages of the hash keyword routing over a random selection
of the next hop we compared the success rate and the average path lenght of freenet
and a gossiping protocol.
Figure 4.2 shows that the Freenet routing converges quickly and outperforms
the gossiping protocol. The average path lenght is computed only on request that
return a positive result, this explain the high variance of the gossiping curve for
early rounds. The gossiping without caching is stateless and provides results after
a search on an average of 10 hops. The gossiping with caching improves with
time since documents get replicated (more likely to be found). The difference
between gossiping-with-caching and freenet is only the hashed keyword routing,
which provides the expected improvement on the average path lenght and the
success rate (figure 4.3).
4.2.2 Effect of underlying routing protocol
The goal of routing layer in the MANET is to maintain connectivity amongst node
in presence of mobility and link failiures. Since the Freenet application depends on
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Figure 4.2: Average path lenght
Figure 4.3: Success rate
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Figure 4.4: Avg. time to receive an answer (only successful requests are counted)
while running freenet above different routing protocols
the routing layer to forward its data packets, we looked at the effect of the routing
layer on the performances of freenet. It is usual to evaluate routing protocols by
using Constant Bit Rate flows between mobile nodes and measure parameters such
as the throughput, goodput, packets lost, etc. However the Freenet layer depends
more on a short delay than a high reliability or low overhead of the routing layer.
As figure 4.4 shows, the two on-demand routing protocols (DSR and AODV)
provide comparable results but DSDV needs a certain time (almost 20 rounds)
before it can provide satisfying delays. The average time to answer a freenet request
over DSDV is so large that it cannot be explained by just looking at DSDV; does
this suggest the presence of bugs in the NS-2 implementation of DSDV?
4.2.3 Diversity of evidence
A characteristic of Freenet and many other p2p system is that for one request, one
document is provided as an answer. With a gossiping protocol a user can reiterate
its request multiple time to discover more than one document (since the exploration
is random). However this is not possible with freenet. Repeating the same request
will lead to the same result since the routing is reinforcing good path and there is
no regulation (negative feedback). Moreover the caching of documents is helping
to replicate highly requested documents but is also destroying the diversity of
documents in the system.
Figure 4.5 shows the difference between Freenet and a gossiping protocol at
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Figure 4.5: Comparing Freenet and Gossiping on the diversity of evidence pre-
served
preserving diversity. The same documents have been inserted and are requested in
both experiment. A specific document is provided by four different sources (i.e. a
piece of evidence is provided by 4 different principals); however in Freenet one of
the source (source 2) is never discovered and, worst, a source dominates the other
(source 4) after enough rounds. This is not the case with the gossiping protocol,
the exploration being completely random (and stateless) all sources are exploited




5.1 Conclusions and future work
The notion of trust establishment in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) can differ
from that in the (mobile) Internet in fundamental ways. Specifically, it has the
trust establishment process has to be (1) peer-to-peer, (2) short, fast, and on-line-
only, and (3) flexible enough to allow uncertain and incomplete trust evidence.
We presentend a framework for trust establishment that supports the require-
ments for MANETs and relies on peer-to-peer file-sharing for evidence distribution
through the network. The problem of evidence distribution for trust establishment
is somewhat different than the usual file sharing problem in peer-to-peer networks.
For this reason, and we proposed to use a ”swarm intelligence” approach for the
to design of trust evidence distribution instead of simply relying on an ordinary
peer-to-peer, file-sharing system. In future work, we plan to evaluate the perfor-
mance of ”swarm”-based algorithms for trust evidence distribution and revocation
in a MANET environment.
Finally, we also argued that the design of metrics for the evaluation of trust
evidence is a crucial aspect of trust establishment in MANETs. In future work, we
plan to develop a trust management scheme integrating the confidence valuation
of trust evidence with real-time, policy-compliance checking.
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